242 MY MEMOIRS

persuade me to save a rebel leader who had been condemned-to death by the Spaniards. Naturally I refused to intervene in this way; so far as I know, the idea of extending German power to the Philippines was never afterwards seriously considered in any quarter in Germany. Whilst we appeared off Manila during the Spanish-America war with a squadron which was stronger than the American, we maintained ticklish relations between the two navies, and on the occasion of a collision with Admiral Dewey, Flag-lieutenant (later Secretary of State) von Hintze upheld German honour by his cool-headedness and prevented the danger of a conflict. There remained, however, in the United States, which had just stepped into international politics with a definite purpose in view, the suspicion that we had made an unsuccessful attempt to poach on preserves which they had discovered first. This vexation, which was skilfully fed by the English press and diplomacy, swelled the suspicion that we were cherishing intentions on American territory. The Americans were ignorant of European affairs, and sensitive enough with their Monroe Doctrine to believe this kind of nonsense.

When in 1902 the English Government invited us to take common action with Roosevelt's consent against the brigand President of Venezuela, Castro, I advised, in the conference at the Foreign Office, against compliance, basing my opinion on my impressions of American character and English policy. Carl Schurz, in whom German-Americans still had a leader at that